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**NATION REBUILDING AND THE NEED TO CONSIDER IT WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC BOMBING (U)**


By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:



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15. Abstract: The quest for more humane war is receiving considerable attention within the various Services. Nonetheless, current trends indicate that initial engagement of the belligerent will be accomplished not through less intrusive methods, but through more intrusive methods. There is a very real risk that the United States is on a trend toward "bomb them into the Stone Age" and then send in the ground forces if they are required. This mentality appears to be a politicians dream come true; make a clear and unequivocal point and don't sacrifice a single American life in the process. It is also appealing to some senior military leadership in that there is again no requirement to send a large contingent of American ground forces into harms way. Lastly, the American people like the current method of waging war because it ensures the American ego is properly fed and nurtured. This ego nurturing maintains the position of United States supremacy within the worlds fighting forces through the use of technology not available to the remainder of the world. With all of the members of the Clausewitzian Trinity in agreement, one should be tempted to ask, "Why should the US the worry about its current tendency toward waging war from afar? The answer to the question is that high dependence on technological superiority could lead to devastating consequences if a	

belligerent finds a way to defeat this United States strategy, such as an appeal to the American public that dishonorable means are being employed by the political and military establishment to accomplish United States national policies. This paper will address that question, with a focus on the long view of military might and its application. More importantly, it will enlarge the traditional time horizon to encompass war from the initiation of hostilities through to the completion of nation rebuilding; well after the termination of war.

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ABSTRACT

The quest for more humane war is receiving considerable attention within the various Services. Nonetheless, current trends indicate that initial engagement of the belligerent will be accomplished not through less intrusive methods, but through more intrusive methods. There is a very real risk that the United States is on a trend toward "bomb them into the Stone Age" and then send in the ground forces if they are required. This mentality appears to be a politicians dream come true; make a clear and unequivocal point and don't sacrifice a single American life in the process. It is also appealing to some senior military leadership in that there is again no requirement to send a large contingent of American ground forces into harms way. Lastly, the American people like the current method of waging war because it ensures the American ego is properly fed and nurtured. This ego nurturing maintains the position of United States supremacy within the worlds fighting forces through the use of technology not available to the remainder of the world. With all of the members of the Clausewitzian Trinity in agreement, one should be tempted to ask, "Why should the US the worry about its current tendency toward waging war from afar? The answer to the question is that high dependence on technological superiority could lead to devastating consequences if a belligerent finds a way to defeat this United States strategy, such as an appeal to the American public that dishonorable means are being employed by the political and military establishment to accomplish United States national policies. This paper will address that question, with a focus on the long view of military might and its application. More importantly, it will enlarge the traditional time horizon to encompass war from the initiation of hostilities through to the completion of nation rebuilding; well after the termination of war.

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I. Introduction

The advent of rapid and mass communications in a wartime environment has changed the American way of waging war forever. Gone are the days of indiscriminate suffering being applied to the populace such as was applied in the massive bombing campaigns of World War II and the excessive tactical bombings against the Viet Cong during that undeclared war. In many ways, one could argue that the United States has returned to its founding father's precepts relative to the effective accomplishment of war. Many will recall that General George Washington refused to allow his men to take food, shelter or other necessities from the surrounding townspeople and farmers unless payment was made for the good or service. In spite of this honorable war foundation, there should be no mistake about the intent of the United States when it enters into war. The United States always expects to win every war. Further, it is very unforgiving of those who lose or are perceived to be losers. This tension between winning and losing and between honorable action and dishonorable action strikes at the very heart of the American military leader. Iran Contra and the Central Intelligence Agency practice of targeting leaders for assassination are both examples of conduct that were deemed dishonorable by the American public and halted due to public outcry. Table 1 below depicts the unforgiving nature of America that military leaders must understand and accept.

	Honorable	Dishonorable
Win	Yes	No
Lose	No	No

Table 1

The quest for more humane war is receiving considerable attention within the various Services. Nonetheless, current trends indicate that initial engagement of the belligerent will be accomplished not through less intrusive methods, but through more intrusive methods. There is

a very real risk that the United States is clearly on a trend toward “bomb them into the Stone Age” and then send in the ground forces if they are required. This mentality appears to be a politicians dream come true; make a clear and unequivocal point and don’t sacrifice a single American life in the process. It is also appealing to some senior military leadership in that there is again no requirement to send a large contingent of American ground forces into harms way. Lastly, the American people like the current method of waging war because it ensures the American ego is properly fed and nurtured. This ego nurturing maintains the position of United States supremacy within the worlds fighting forces through the use of technology not available to the remainder of the world.

With all of the members of the Clausewitzian Trinity in agreement, one should be tempted to ask, “Why should the US worry about its current tendency toward waging war from afar? In speaking about the people, the government and the military, Clausewitz stated:

“These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted

in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A

theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship

between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this

reason alone it is totally useless. Our task therefore is to develop a theory

that maintains a balance between three tendencies, like an object suspended

between three magnets.”[1]

The answer to the question is that high dependence on technological superiority could lead to devastating consequences if a belligerent finds a way to defeat this United States strategy, such as appeal to the American public that dishonorable means are being employed by the political and military establishments to accomplish the United States national policies. This paper will

address that question, with a focus on the long view of military might and its application. More importantly, it will enlarge the traditional time horizon to encompass war from the initiation of hostilities through to the completion of nation rebuilding; well after the termination of war.

Graphically, this can be portrayed as depicted in Chart 1. The merging of military art and science can be seen at the crossover point of the two lines. Based upon the premise that the United States will continue with its nation rebuilding paradigm into the future, the military services must improve their ability to reduce the margin of error associated with improperly identifying the strategic bombing/ground force crossover point.

Crossover Points: Current and Proposed




Chart 1

The crossover point of the current use of strategic bombing and ground forces results in a higher cost to rebuild the nation at the conclusion of hostilities. This is true because bombing is inherently more destructive than are ground forces. Using less strategic bombing and

committing ground forces sooner will result in less destruction of the belligerent nation that will have to be rebuilt by the United States after war termination. Carl von Clausewitz makes two very clear points that are relevant to this discussion. First, he says: “No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”^[2] This is a clear warning to the political leadership of a country that they should not and indeed cannot embark on the journey to war in a careless manner. “America must go beyond war termination to a final end state”^[3] before it considers entering a war. The rational calculus of war is supreme. Of equally great importance in the making of war and peace, von Clausewitz states:

“Of even greater influence on the decision to make peace is the consciousness of all the efforts yet to come. Since war is not an act of senseless passion but controlled by its political object, the value of the object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.”^[4]

At the time of Carl von Clausewitz’s writings, the normal result of war was the victor directing the loser to pay war reparations. Therefore, the value of the object did not have to include any consideration relative to rebuilding the losing nation after war termination. The current United States approach to post war involvement is normally that the United States will enter into the country to provide economic development funds and nation rebuilding funds to help ensure the nation will quickly become self sustaining and that it will align itself with the United States for the foreseeable future. If during von Clausewitz’s time the victorious nation

would, as a matter of policy, have always invested its resources in the losing country, then one can be very confident that he would have overtly included post war considerations in his discussion of the value of the object. Since this is not the case, it is left to those of us who follow in the rich heritage he left to add new relevant insights to his foundational precepts. Such was the case with sea power and his lack of discussion of it. As a man of Continental focus, Clausewitz did not address sea power. Therefore men like Corbet and Mahan were compelled to introduce the same intellectual rigor in sea power usage as a military instrument as Clausewitz did for ground combat. Additionally, air power did not exist at the time, and therefore he could not possibly have been expected to address its use and overuse. However, his insights into the trinity, economy of force and the value of the object fit nicely within the framework of a discussion on strategic bombing.

II. Arguments in Favor of Including the Nation Rebuilding Aspect of War

The United States Air Force is technologically the most advanced and best trained Air Force in the world. It has proven itself as a viable instrument of political power for the United States. However, it does have its limitations.

“Strategic turning movements whereby ground forces maneuvered to impose themselves across the defender’s lines of communications often were effective not so much because the supply lines had been cut by previous air attacks but because the defender was dislocated and had to attack in the wrong direction and under unfavorable circumstances. Air interdiction lacks an important characteristic: it can destroy, but it cannot envelop.”^[5]

Col. John A. Warden III of the U.S. Air Force identifies five concentric circles in a strategic targeting context. “The most important element-the enemy command-is in the center circle; essential production is second; the transportation network is third; the population is fourth; and the fielded military force-the shield and spear-are fifth.”^[6] This author believes Col. Warden has correctly identified these concentric circles, however, it must be understood that all military pressure must be used with the intent to bring about accomplishment of the political objectives that drove the nation to a military response in the first place. Some of the concentric circles are more vulnerable than others and immediately become candidates for military operations because of this vulnerability. Unfortunately, all too often, there may not be a serious review of the impact of the decision on public opinion at home. Referring again to Table 1, it is important to remember that while Americans are unforgiving of leaders who lose, they are also unforgiving of victory at the expense of honor. A decision to attack the populace or perhaps even the industry of a belligerent nation could have the intended political consequences but it

may equally well have unintended domestic consequences. Therefore, decisions to bombard these must be considered long and hard; perhaps removed from consideration altogether. The evidence from World War II suggests that constant bombing of German factories and civil infrastructure failed to do anything to accomplish the stated objective of unconditional surrender of the German political establishment. This lesson must not be lost today simply because the United States possesses highly accurate weaponry that can strike with pinpoint precision in a nations industrial complex. It must be remembered that civilians are typically working in these industrial complexes and they are precisely the ones the United States desires to see rise up at the conclusion of hostilities and align themselves with the United States. Further, the destruction of commercial industrial complexes fails to consider the substantial investment required by the United States after hostilities; the new Marshall Plan that is developed in varying degrees during every conflict entered into by the United States. This paper does not recommend the removal of all purely commercial industrial targets from the target selection process. It does however, suggest that careful selection criteria should be developed and high confidence should exist to support the belief that either removal of the capability will decisively impact the belligerent political leader in an adverse manner, will substantially reduce the loss of life on the behalf of American and coalition forces or will have significant impact on the civilian populace such that they will force the belligerent to consider capitulation. The latter is considered to be quite unlikely by this author in a dictatorship form of government. Otherwise, these targets should be bypassed for targets that will compel the adversary to capitulate more rapidly. This same point applies to the transportation network concentric circle. Only those roads, bridges, railroads, ports, air fields, and communications that significantly and directly contribute to the enemy war effort should be considered. Clearly, the communications system of the enemy is nearly always

a legitimate target. For, it is through communications that both instructions to the military are provided and propaganda to the civilians is provided. Removal of the powerful communications system tool from the enemy can often render the military impotent. However, it must be viewed as a part of the cost of nation rebuilding.

Professor David M. Goodrich, identified two very important aspects of costs to be borne by the United States due to the misapplication of strategic bombing. Specifically discussing the bombing in Kosovo he states: "Virtually all ethnic Albanian private property in Kosovo, particularly their homes, was destroyed by Serb forces during NATO operations. In all probability, the cost of replacing this property will be borne by the UN/NATO, primarily the US."^[7] This is an interesting observation in that it identifies a weakness of both air power and a weakness in the application of air power. Air power has little or no way to accurately identify enemy forces when they are blended with friendly forces or civilians. These enemy forces can only be taken out by air power with an increased (and probably unacceptably high) risk of civilian casualties and collateral property damage. A second point made is: "A large percentage of the U.S. Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) stockpile was expended in Yugoslavia during the NATO air campaign. Production lines for some of these munitions are no longer in operation, and replacement of the remaining PGMs will be very expensive."^[8] These munitions were expended and will now have to be replaced through the federal budget process. Since budget dollars are being expended for munitions, the dollars are no longer available for other priorities or the budget will have to be increased. Both solutions result in a cost to the American taxpayer that should be considered before making a decision to apply strategic bombing in a massive manner as was done in Kosovo. It should be remembered that the 78 day bombing campaign was initially touted as a four day campaign. Even assuming that air power "won" by itself,

which is debatable, one must still question the appropriateness of the strategic bombing instrument if the initial expectation of time was off by a factor of 19.5. Of equal importance, there is the question of whether bombing caused the change of heart by the leadership or if the Russian diplomacy actually provided the change. There is considerable speculation that the Russians, as longtime allies, used their political influence to convince Slobodan Milosevic that he should cease his hostile activities before even the Russians could no longer support him against the outrage being directed at him by the media from around the world. Related to this Russian diplomacy is the realization that he had basically achieved all his objectives before yielding.

III. Arguments Against Including the Nation Rebuilding Aspect of War

War has become progressively more complex over the centuries. Advances in technology during this century have substantially outstripped the ability of the military officers to make judgment calls on which method of international coercion should be used when the military instrument is selected for use by the political leadership. Even as recently as May 3, 2000, there are strong endorsements of the victory strategic bombing can bring to a conflict. "As "SACEUR," General Clark won NATO's victory in Kosovo, validating the intervention against Belgrade ordered by the United States and its European allies."^[9] There are proponents for each of the arguments listed below. Each one has some value worthy of consideration as dialogue begins regarding the concept of nation rebuilding within a target selection and fire power usage context. However, none are strong enough on their own or collectively to negate the necessity of including nation rebuilding in the military equation. Following are the arguments.

The addition of a concept such as optimum crossover point between strategic bombing and ground forces employment attempts to paint too detailed a picture of an environment that is already filled with "the fog of war". The granularity required to establish even the current crossover is contingent upon many things. Political limitations, weather (current and expected), intelligence, time before the mission has to occur, number of enemy forces, quality of enemy defenses, and geography are only a few of the necessary attributes required to establish the current "best guess" for determining the appropriate time to transition from strategic bombing intended to obtain capitulation or make the enemy soft enough for ground employment. Expecting the military commander to project the cost to rebuild national infrastructure is an unreasonable expectation within the context of an already near impossible task. However, while

absolute granularity may be impossible to determine, a more subjective method may be used that compares various courses of action against one another. This rating can assume the descriptors of high, medium and low in terms of cost to rebuild.

Others argue that while this hypothesis is interesting, it is not the responsibility of the military leadership to develop and champion. There is a very clear and distinct line between the time of war and peace after hostilities are concluded. Accordingly, once the United States determines it is appropriate to act via military force, the rebuilding after the fact belongs to other departments within the federal government. The Departments of State and Commerce are responsible for nation rebuilding, not the Department of Defense. This view fails to consider the fact that the United States entered into the conflict in the first place as a matter of political belief that military force was necessary. Further, initially, the military will probably be the only agency capable of initiating a nation rebuilding program.

Still others offer that strategic bombing does reduce casualties incurred by the United States and its allies. In a democracy, the casualty count of friendly forces is a very sensitive aspect of the national will to continue the war until a satisfactory peace is accomplished. Committing ground forces prior to maximum preparation of the battlefield will lead to excessive and unnecessary casualties. As these mount, there is a proportional drop in the will of the nation to continue the war. Since the political objectives of the nation are of paramount importance, there can be no consideration of reducing the margin of victory through reducing the application of strategic bombing. To the contrary, evidence suggests the United States is willing to suffer casualties when it believes there are clear objectives and those objectives are deemed appropriate by the American public.

Recently, more and more proponents of strategic bombing have publicly stated or

indicated that wars can be won without the use of ground forces. Speaking of Desert Storm, Col. John Warden states: "By the second week, the coalition had air supremacy and was able to roam freely--above the AAA fire-- to accomplish the rest of its mission over Iraq. The loss of air superiority put Iraq completely under the power of the coalition; what would be destroyed and what would survive was up to the coalition, and Iraq could do nothing. It lay as defenseless as if occupied by a million men. For practical purposes, it had in fact become a state occupied--from the air."^[10] More recently still, Col. Edward C. Mann stated the following case. "Aerospace forces are not significantly bound by most impediments to surface maneuver, nor are they most efficient when operating within imposed boundaries. Their relatively high speeds and rapid maneuver capability allow them to attack from any direction and altitude of their choosing..."^[11] Proponents argue the decisive paralysis of the enemy can be accomplished through strategic bombing alone. There is little or no need for ground forces to be placed in harms way when the technological air superiority of the United States is placed against any foe in the reasonable future. However, there is no war or armed conflict in which objective observers can confidently state that strategic bombing alone forced the capitulation of the enemy.

The United States should abandon its unwritten policy of nation rebuilding after it has defeated a foe. There is little or no utility in shifting the probability of success from the United States to its opponents. There is little evidence that a war the size of World War II will occur anytime in the next generation. Therefore, only small, limited and localized wars and conflicts will be fought. The need for a new Marshall Plan aimed at rebuilding small regions of the world is negligible. If belligerent national leaders understand their nation will not be rebuilt, they will be less inclined to initiate hostilities that will bring the United States into the conflict in the first place. This particular argument incorrectly assumes the belligerent will always act in a manner

consistent with American values. Since Western "rational" actions do not exist in all countries around the world, it is inappropriate to postulate that an enemy will elect not to act aggressively simply because he believes his nation will not be rebuilt should he lose the conflict. Indeed, the preponderance of human history shows that nations have been willing to fight other nations even when payment of war reparations by the loser was the norm.

IV. Analysis

None of the arguments against the thesis adequately address the real issue of modern state craft. Military means should only be used to further the valid objectives of the state. It is never in the best interest of a state to see possible markets of the future needlessly destroyed because the leaders of the their own nation failed to consider the long term affects of an action. Further, the United States cannot (and indeed should not) allow the "CNN image" of modern communications to depict it as a nation that is driven by unethical aggression toward the rest of the world. National leadership is first and foremost about posturing that nation for survival in the immediate future and preparing it to thrive in the longer term future. Any actions that hamper these objectives must be viewed as suspect.

Some would attempt to argue that the United States public is casualty averse. Therefore, there is no appropriate consideration that can be offered here to change the targeting concept to include nation rebuilding. Those who attempt to make the casualty averse argument typically refer to casualties in Vietnam, Beirut and even the Gulf War. That argument, however, fails to accurately check the pulse of the American people. Fifty thousand servicemen and women dead in Vietnam is hardly an accurate depiction of a casualty averse nation. Estimates from military planners in preparation for Desert Storm believed that in excess of 10,000 casualties would be tallied during the Gulf War. While the American public did not want to lose a single life, it was not averse to losing these numbers. In fact, it must be remembered that first time enlistments and re-enlistments were both up during the Desert Shield time frame in anticipation of the use of force to free Kuwait. Mr. William Doll asserts that "Casualty avoidance is a myth with the American public, but is reality with the American political elite".^[12] Another example that refutes the idea of a casualty averse American public comes from a poll by Steven G. Kull.

Speaking of the poll "Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, College Park, agrees. He designed a poll last spring that asked what the response should be if 50 Americans were killed in a Kosovo battle. Twenty percent said U.S. Troops should be immediately withdrawn, 35 percent favored reinforcing the soldiers, and 21 percent picked "stay the course." Asked what response they preferred if 250 Americans were killed but the Serbs were forced out of Kosovo and the ethnic Albanians returned, 60 percent favored using ground troops. Other polls found similar responses, says Kull."^[13] There is no evidence to support this casualty averse assertion made by many.

There is, however evidence to support the assertion that an American public is casualty averse if there are no clearly defined objectives. This lack of clearly defined objectives is (among other things) why the United States public lost its willingness to suffer casualties in Vietnam and is why Somalia and Beirut were such a disasters as well. Unfortunately, the politicians and to a great degree, the military leadership have both misread the public. This misreading yields excessive reliance on strategic bombing when it should be driving the decision makers to better informed and more consistent decisions. Further, it tends to cause decision makers, both civilians in suits and military in uniforms, to make easy choices that are wrong choices when all the facts are accurately placed upon the table for review and analysis. The most probable wrong choice to be selected by leaders is that of strategic bombing as the instrument even when the risk associated with it being effective toward achieving the objectives is high.

The belief by many that providing enough pressure on any of the five concentric circles identified and discussed by John A. Warden III will result in causing a belligerent to capitulate quickly fails to look at the historical evidence that leads one to a different conclusion. In a

democracy, the people are likely to have the capacity to exert influence on the political leadership. In those cases, it is conceivable that concentric circle two (industrial production) and circle four (the population) will have an impact upon the leadership. However, one must still grapple with the honor and dishonor discussed above. After grappling with this aspect of the problem, it is expected that a decision would be reached that concludes the political fallout would be greater than the utility gained from such an attack. This is because the American people, and indeed democracies in general, make a clear distinction between those involved in combat and those who happen to be in the crossfire of combat. One only need look at the major television network reporters spread across the battlefield to find evidence that democracies will not tolerate attacks on civilian targets as an appropriate means to the stated objectives. Even during World War II, the British did not demand their government surrender to Germany after the Germans bombed London. In fact, the resolve of the British people was strengthened against the German aggressors.

Should the belligerent country be a dictatorship, the people have little to say about the hardships they must endure. Since all actions should be taken to obtain the object of a conflict and the objective is always to compel another nation to do your own nations will, it makes no sense to attack either concentric circles two or four. The people are helpless to change their status within the country and may even gather around the dictator the United States is trying to oust or otherwise correct. Should that occur consistently as it did in World War II and more recently in Kosovo, then the United States is faced with a hostile public in the occupied country after hostilities and with a substantially increased rebuild burden to reestablish the country on a reasonable footing. It is clear from the historical evidence that a belligerent will not capitulate from the use of strategic bombing alone.

V. Conclusion

The art and science of war are more closely tied together now than at anytime in history. Yet, this close relationship is quickly reaching a state of dis-equilibrium due to continued reliance on old techniques in target selection. Countries where war and major conflicts are being fought are no longer always populated by citizens who are the side show of humanity. They are viable countries with viable citizens. These citizens have greater intelligence than ever before and are more informed than even five years ago. They will be making decisions to support American interests in their region in the future or to be antagonistic to the United States. The United States cannot afford to allow its superior worldwide military might to be used in a manner that is contrary to the long term best interests of the United States. Any conflicts that the United States enters into must have clear objectives at the outset. Included in these objectives must be the realization that alienating the public of a temporarily belligerent nation is counter to the United States vital interests.

Evidence of United States ownership of nation rebuilding costs is exemplified by the following article from The Dallas Morning News. Speaking of an Army Reserve unit from San Antonio the article said: "They'll be operating an asphalt plant while serving with peacekeeping forces in Kosovo. The material will be used to pave streets and the runway at Camp Bondsteel, the main U.S. base."¹⁴ The costs associated with this type venture are twofold. First, there is the material and labor cost that the U.S. is putting into rebuilding the roads and the U.S. airfield. This cost is being borne by the military in the current year. It will last up to 270 days. The cost associated with calling up, deploying and sustaining the soldiers and materiel used by the 277th Engineer Company is staggering. The U.S. taxpayer is paying for that cost now. The second cost is more subtle, but equally prolific. In this case, each Reservist that is deployed from his or

her normal civilian job is not producing for the nation's economy. Their services in the private sector are either being covered to some degree by another employee or are not being performed at all. In either case, the economy is not attaining the level of efficiency required for the United States to remain a world leader in productivity.

As recently as May 2, 2000, The Boston Globe reported the following: "After a thank-the-troops tour by Defense Secretary William S. Cohen to two American bases that have already become self-sufficient towns, the top US commander in Kosovo predicted yesterday that NATO peacekeepers will have to remain in the Balkans for at least a generation."^[15] This honest assessment by Brigadier General Ricardo Sanchez clearly makes the point that a failure to consider the long term ramifications of executive decisions will hamper the military in both the short term and long term. Any national treasury dollars that are incorrectly spent on an extended air campaign such as occurred in Kosovo will diminish the capability of the services to carry out their national security requirements without additional resources being made available. This naturally leads one back to the true value of the object as discussed earlier. Further, the continued cost to deploy forces for the next generation to the Balkans will also require significant resources from the national treasury. In both cases, treasury dollars are not available for other purposes when they have inappropriately been applied to cover past sins of senior leaders within the political and military structure. Decisive and correct actions must be taken when the decision is made to use military force to compel the will of the United States upon another nation.

VI. Recommendations

This paper has attempted to introduce a new element in the equation of strategic bombing vs. ground forces. There are some obvious and not so obvious recommendations to facilitate accomplishment of this. Foundational to all recommendations are the following assumptions:

1. The United States still values honorable victory.
2. The United States will continue its tradition of nation rebuilding.
3. The United States is a country that is willing to suffer casualties when presented with a valid objective.
4. The United States expects excellence in assessment and execution from its senior political and military leaders.

First, the military senior leadership should accept responsibility for informing the political leadership that air power, as powerful as it is, is not the end all in military warfare. Technology applied by air power provides the decisive edge to the United States in any conventional conflict. This decisive edge must be maintained and sharpened to an ever greater level of precision. But, it can still never be assumed to be the only military instrument available to leaders.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 required the military to plan and fight as a joint organization, while retaining the capabilities of the individual services. Senior political leaders need to be reminded of this fact and strongly encouraged to consider all the tools available before selecting the easy but not necessarily appropriate tool of strategic bombing. Kosovo was not viewed by the military leadership as an action that would best be accomplished through use of strategic bombing, yet strategic bombing was the tool selected by the political leadership of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Since the bombing did not win the

war in Kosovo, it should be held up by the military leadership as an example of a very good and powerful tool being misapplied.

Senior leaders need be sure that legitimate objectives are in place before initiating military actions. Casualty aversion resulting from a ground campaign will not occur within the American public if there is a sense of "oughtness" in the minds of the people. Failure to place a valid objective in front of the American people will lead to aversion, but it will be because of the lack of purpose, not the lack of will to do the right thing. The United States national interests and a sense of responsibility to protect the poor and down cast will be met within the American public with open arms and a willingness to act decisively. The American public learned from the Vietnam experience. The leadership of the United States should ensure that it does not learn incorrectly from the Vietnam experience.

The United States should always consider the fastest method to obtain capitulation when determining which instruments of the nation should be used to accomplish United States national will. Typically, it will never be a single instrument. Instead, it will be a combination or succession of instruments that channel the belligerent leader into bowing to United States national will. To that extent, the objectives should always include clear statements about the removal of the offending leadership or clear statements that any further actions contrary to United States national will and human decency will be met with substantial and overwhelming force aimed directly at the offending national leader. It should be clear in word and deed that the United States has no ill will toward the people of the offending country, only against the leadership of that country. Speaking and then following up on this with actions intended to compel the belligerent leader to capitulate will go a long way toward solving the over bombing problem we are encountering today and the problem of rebuilding a nation in the future.

This paper does not pretend to hold all the answers to this complicated issue. It does provide a point of debarkation to enable dialogue to begin in this area. The United States cannot continue to invest ever increasing resources into rebuilding destroyed nations without considering the rebuilding in the formula before the hostilities begin. This paper can serve as a point of common reference for all parties in the development of a national policy for entry into conflict and rebuilding at the conclusion of conflict. "No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it." [16] is more important now than it has ever been in the history of mankind.

End notes

- [1] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 89.
- [2] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 579.
- [3] William Doll, Telephone Interview April 11, 2000, Strategic Initiatives Directorate, Joint Warfare Analysis Center.
- [4] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 92.
- [5] Martin van Creveld with S. L. Canby and K. S. Brower, Air power and Maneuver Warfare, (Air University Press, 1994), p. 207.
- [6] John A. Warden III, *Employing Air Power in the Twenty First Century*, in The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, (Air University Press, 1992) p. 65.
- [7] David M. Goodrich, *AIRPOWER ALONE WON IN KOSOVO...OR DID IT?*, (Unpublished and undated article).
- [8] David M. Goodrich, *AIRPOWER ALONE WON IN KOSOVO...OR DID IT?*, (Unpublished and undated article).
- [9] Joseph Fitchett, *Clark Recalls 'Lessons' of Kosovo*, (International Herald Tribune, May 3, 2000).
- [10] John A. Warden III, *Employing Air Power in the Twenty First Century*, in The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, (Air University Press, 1992) p. 75.
- [11] Edward C. Mann, Thunder and Lightning, Volume Two, (Air University Press, 1995) p. 177.
- [12] William Doll, Telephone Interview April 11, 2000, Strategic Initiatives Directorate, Joint Warfare Analysis Center.
- [13] Tom Bowman, *Cost Of War: A New Accounting*, (Baltimore Sun, March 22, 2000).
- [14] Ed Timms, *Reserves to Pave Way for Kosovo Peacekeepers*, (The Dallas Morning News, April 17, 2000).
- [15] John Donnelly, *US General Sees Long Role In Balkans*, (The Boston Globe, May 2, 2000).

[16] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 579.

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